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First price auctions: Monotonicity and uniqueness

✍ Scribed by Gustavo E. Rodriguez

Publisher
Springer-Verlag
Year
2000
Tongue
English
Weight
212 KB
Volume
29
Category
Article
ISSN
0020-7276

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