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Monotonicity in asymmetric first-price auctions with affiliation

✍ Scribed by David McAdams

Publisher
Springer-Verlag
Year
2006
Tongue
English
Weight
493 KB
Volume
35
Category
Article
ISSN
0020-7276

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