Ambiguity aversion in first-price sealed-bid auctions
β Scribed by Ahtia Salo; Martin Weber
- Publisher
- Springer
- Year
- 1995
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 829 KB
- Volume
- 11
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0895-5646
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
π SIMILAR VOLUMES
Bidding the same price in descending bid auctions and in first price sealed bid auctions is equivalent to expected utility maximizing behavior, and this is equivalent to dynamically consistent bidding. The claim that, in strategic form, descending bid and first price sealed bid auctions are the same
## Abstract Estimating bidders' risk aversion in auctions is a challenging problem because of identification issues. This paper takes advantage of bidding data from two auction designs to identify nonparametrically the bidders' utility function within a private value framework. In particular, ascen