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Delegation in first-price all-pay auctions

✍ Scribed by Kai A. Konrad; Wolfgang Peters; Karl Wärneryd

Publisher
John Wiley and Sons
Year
2004
Tongue
English
Weight
126 KB
Volume
25
Category
Article
ISSN
0143-6570

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✦ Synopsis

Abstract

In a first‐price all‐pay auction buyers have an incentive to delegate the bidding to agents and to provide these agents with incentives to make bids that differ from the bids the buyers would like to make. Both buyers are better off in this strictly non‐cooperative delegation equilibrium and the delegation contracts are asymmetric, even if the buyers and the auction are perfectly symmetric. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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