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Asymmetry in first-price auctions with affiliated private values

โœ Scribed by Sandra Campo; Isabelle Perrigne; Quang Vuong


Publisher
John Wiley and Sons
Year
2003
Tongue
English
Weight
416 KB
Volume
18
Category
Article
ISSN
0883-7252

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โœฆ Synopsis


Abstract

Collusion and heterogeneity across firms may introduce asymmetry in bidding games. A major difficulty in asymmetric auctions is that the Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies are solutions of an intractable system of differential equations. We propose a simple method for estimating asymmetric firstโ€price auctions with affiliated private values. Considering two types of bidders, we show that these differential equations can be rewritten using the observed bid distribution. We establish the identification of the model, characterize its theoretical restrictions, and propose a twoโ€step nonโ€parametric estimation procedure for estimating the private value distributions. An empirical analysis of joint bidding in OCS auctions is provided. Copyright ยฉ 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.


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