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Bidder collusion at first-price auctions

✍ Scribed by Giuseppe Lopomo; Leslie M. Marx; Peng Sun


Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
2010
Tongue
English
Weight
527 KB
Volume
15
Category
Article
ISSN
1434-4750

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Delegation in first-price all-pay auctio
✍ Kai A. Konrad; Wolfgang Peters; Karl WΓ€rneryd πŸ“‚ Article πŸ“… 2004 πŸ› John Wiley and Sons 🌐 English βš– 126 KB

## Abstract In a first‐price all‐pay auction buyers have an incentive to delegate the bidding to agents and to provide these agents with incentives to make bids that differ from the bids the buyers would like to make. Both buyers are better off in this strictly non‐cooperative delegation equilibriu