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Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation

โœ Scribed by David McAdams


Book ID
113707829
Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
2007
Tongue
English
Weight
354 KB
Volume
136
Category
Article
ISSN
0022-0531

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## Abstract Collusion and heterogeneity across firms may introduce asymmetry in bidding games. A major difficulty in asymmetric auctions is that the Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies are solutions of an intractable system of differential equations. We propose a simple method for estimating asymm