๐”– Bobbio Scriptorium
โœฆ   LIBER   โœฆ

First-price auctions without affiliation

โœ Scribed by Paulo Klinger Monteiro; Humberto Moreira


Book ID
116421215
Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
2006
Tongue
English
Weight
123 KB
Volume
91
Category
Article
ISSN
0165-1765

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๐Ÿ“œ SIMILAR VOLUMES


Asymmetry in first-price auctions with a
โœ Sandra Campo; Isabelle Perrigne; Quang Vuong ๐Ÿ“‚ Article ๐Ÿ“… 2003 ๐Ÿ› John Wiley and Sons ๐ŸŒ English โš– 416 KB

## Abstract Collusion and heterogeneity across firms may introduce asymmetry in bidding games. A major difficulty in asymmetric auctions is that the Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies are solutions of an intractable system of differential equations. We propose a simple method for estimating asymm