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The Manipulation of Voting Systems

✍ Scribed by David Hartvigsen

Publisher: Springer
Year: 2007
Tongue: English
Weight: 122 KB
Volume: 80
Category: Article
ISSN: 0167-4544
DOI: 10.1007/s10551-007-9438-9

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

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