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Manipulability of voting by sincere truncation of preferences

โœ Scribed by Peter C. Fishburn; Steven J. Brams

Publisher
Springer US
Year
1984
Tongue
English
Weight
741 KB
Volume
44
Category
Article
ISSN
0048-5829

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