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A note on manipulability of large voting schemes

โœ Scribed by Bezalel Peleg

Publisher
Springer US
Year
1979
Tongue
English
Weight
434 KB
Volume
11
Category
Article
ISSN
0040-5833

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

โœฆ Synopsis

A voting system is a rule which assigns to every possible combination of votes (by any number of individuals) an alternative. We define the notion of asymptotic nonmanipulability for voting systems, and prove that every representable positiormlist voting system is asymptotically nonmanipulable. Various aspects of manipulation of large voting schemes and several examples are also discussed.

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