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Manipulation and strategic voting in the Norwegian parliament

✍ Scribed by Bjørn Erik Rasch

Publisher
Springer US
Year
1987
Tongue
English
Weight
990 KB
Volume
52
Category
Article
ISSN
0048-5829

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✦ Synopsis

The Norwegian parliament uses a sequential voting procedure. After some general remarks on how the legislature can avoid strategic voting by choosing an appropriate voting order, and an exposition of the rules whereby the agenda is determined in this particular parliament, voting order manipulation is examined. A manipulative actor tries to bring about voting sequences in accordance with his interests, but contrary to the putative will of other actors. An example illustrates how manipulation may take place in practice, but it is stressed thatthe realm of manipulation easily escapes empirical analysis. To grasp the different types of manipulation in legislative voting, models are needed that are rich in institutional detail.

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