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Strategic voting and the borda method

✍ Scribed by William G. Ludwin

Publisher: Springer US
Year: 1978
Tongue: English
Weight: 255 KB
Volume: 33
Category: Article
ISSN: 0048-5829
DOI: 10.1007/bf00123946

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

📜 SIMILAR VOLUMES

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It is shown that, for a suitably chosen probability function, the maximum likelihood rule for vote aggregation coincides with the Borda rule, thus, partially reconciling the Borda and the Condorcet methods.

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The purpose of this note is to correct some inaccuracies in the literature regarding sophisticated voting under Borda's method. It is shown that if a single candidate must be elected and voters vote sophisticatedly under Borda's method, then: (1) Contrary to both claims, a voter's undominated votin

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This paper uses a particular choice rule over sets of alternatives under the Pareto rule. Starting from the sincere situation every strategic misrevelation of preference is shown to be an improvement for all voters. The existence of an equilibrium under successive misrepresentations by sincere voter

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Voting procedures, which play a major role in the decision making subsystems of group and societal level systems, generate interesting paradoxes. Some have been intensively studied in recent years. The possibility that the alternative chosen by simple plurality voting may not be preferred to the def

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