✦ LIBER ✦

The Pareto rule and strategic voting

✍ Scribed by Ian MacIntyre

Publisher: Springer US
Year: 1991
Tongue: English
Weight: 840 KB
Volume: 31
Category: Article
ISSN: 0040-5833
DOI: 10.1007/bf00134130

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

✦ Synopsis

This paper uses a particular choice rule over sets of alternatives under the Pareto rule. Starting from the sincere situation every strategic misrevelation of preference is shown to be an improvement for all voters. The existence of an equilibrium under successive misrepresentations by sincere voters is demonstrated.

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