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Strategy stability and sincerity in approval voting

✍ Scribed by Luo Yunfeng, Yue Chaoyuan and Chen Ting

Book ID
125254947
Publisher
Springer
Year
1996
Tongue
English
Weight
566 KB
Volume
13
Category
Article
ISSN
0176-1714

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πŸ“œ SIMILAR VOLUMES

Strategy stability and sincerity in appr
Strategy stability and sincerity in approval voting
✍ Yunfeng Luo; Chaoyuan Yue; Ting Chen πŸ“‚ Article πŸ“… 1996 πŸ› Springer 🌐 English βš– 382 KB

This paper investigates the problem of strategy stability and sincerity in approval voting. It gives "strong" support for Fishburn's claim that, among all nonranked voting systems, approval voting is the uniformly most sincere one whenever the number of candidates is not greater than 5.

Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approv
Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
✍ GΓ‘bor ErdΓ©lyi; Markus Nowak; JΓΆrg Rothe πŸ“‚ Article πŸ“… 2009 πŸ› John Wiley and Sons 🌐 English βš– 179 KB

## Abstract We study sincere‐strategy preference‐based approval voting (SP‐AV), a system proposed by Brams and Sanver [1] and here adjusted so as to __coerce__ admissibility of the votes (rather than excluding inadmissible votes __a priori__), with respect to procedural control. In such control sce

Approval voting and strategy analysis: A
Approval voting and strategy analysis: A Venetian example
✍ Marji Lines πŸ“‚ Article πŸ“… 1986 πŸ› Springer US 🌐 English βš– 843 KB

The author presents a historic reconstruction of the single-member constituency election system known as approval voting which was used to elect Venetian dogi for over 500 years. An interesting procedure theoretically, concurrent approval voting is the only sincere single-winner election system. Cen