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Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting

โœ Scribed by Ulle Endriss

Book ID
118811044
Publisher
Springer US
Year
2012
Tongue
English
Weight
262 KB
Volume
74
Category
Article
ISSN
0040-5833

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

๐Ÿ“œ SIMILAR VOLUMES

Strategy stability and sincerity in appr
Strategy stability and sincerity in approval voting
โœ Yunfeng Luo; Chaoyuan Yue; Ting Chen ๐Ÿ“‚ Article ๐Ÿ“… 1996 ๐Ÿ› Springer ๐ŸŒ English โš– 382 KB

This paper investigates the problem of strategy stability and sincerity in approval voting. It gives "strong" support for Fishburn's claim that, among all nonranked voting systems, approval voting is the uniformly most sincere one whenever the number of candidates is not greater than 5.

Efficacy, power and equity under approva
Efficacy, power and equity under approval voting
โœ Peter C. Fishburn; Steven J. Brams ๐Ÿ“‚ Article ๐Ÿ“… 1981 ๐Ÿ› Springer US ๐ŸŒ English โš– 511 KB

Approval voting allows each voter to vote for as many candidates as he wishes in a multicandidate election. Previous studies show that approval voting compares favorably with other practicable election systems. The present study examines the extent to which votes for different numbers of candidates