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Strategy stability and sincerity in approval voting

โœ Scribed by Yunfeng Luo; Chaoyuan Yue; Ting Chen

Publisher
Springer
Year
1996
Tongue
English
Weight
382 KB
Volume
13
Category
Article
ISSN
0176-1714

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

โœฆ Synopsis

This paper investigates the problem of strategy stability and sincerity in approval voting. It gives "strong" support for Fishburn's claim that, among all nonranked voting systems, approval voting is the uniformly most sincere one whenever the number of candidates is not greater than 5.

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## Abstract We study sincereโ€strategy preferenceโ€based approval voting (SPโ€AV), a system proposed by Brams and Sanver [1] and here adjusted so as to __coerce__ admissibility of the votes (rather than excluding inadmissible votes __a priori__), with respect to procedural control. In such control sce

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The author presents a historic reconstruction of the single-member constituency election system known as approval voting which was used to elect Venetian dogi for over 500 years. An interesting procedure theoretically, concurrent approval voting is the only sincere single-winner election system. Cen