Approval voting allows each voter to vote for as many candidates as he wishes in a multicandidate election. Previous studies show that approval voting compares favorably with other practicable election systems. The present study examines the extent to which votes for different numbers of candidates
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Efficacy in small electorates under plurality and approval voting
โ Scribed by Amnon Rapoport; Dan S. Felsenthal
- Publisher
- Springer US
- Year
- 1990
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 554 KB
- Volume
- 64
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0048-5829
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
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