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Approval voting and strategy analysis: A Venetian example

โœ Scribed by Marji Lines


Publisher
Springer US
Year
1986
Tongue
English
Weight
843 KB
Volume
20
Category
Article
ISSN
0040-5833

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

โœฆ Synopsis


The author presents a historic reconstruction of the single-member constituency election system known as approval voting which was used to elect Venetian dogi for over 500 years. An interesting procedure theoretically, concurrent approval voting is the only sincere single-winner election system. Central issues concerning strategy choice under uncertainty are investigated using a contingency-dependent framework of individual behavior given prior probability distributions over decision relevant propositions. Extensions are then proposed for the use of approval procedures in modern elections and other collective decision-making situations. Finally the advantages of trichotomous preferences in decision and strategy analysis are argued.


๐Ÿ“œ SIMILAR VOLUMES


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This paper investigates the problem of strategy stability and sincerity in approval voting. It gives "strong" support for Fishburn's claim that, among all nonranked voting systems, approval voting is the uniformly most sincere one whenever the number of candidates is not greater than 5.

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Brams, Fishburn, and Merrill (1988) contend that the indeterminacy of approval voting (AV), introduced in our paper (1988), is not a vice, but a surpassing virtue of AV. They do not compare the negative versus the positive features of AV, so their assertion remains a conjecture. Our response emphas

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This article discusses an experimental application of the Structured Value Referendum (SVR) with approval voting. The decision context is selecting the best land use for an undeveloped area of publicly owned suburban land in Richmond, British Columbia. Subjects were a random sample of 200 registered