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Social choice rules with vetoers

✍ Scribed by Donald E. Campbell; Jerry S. Kelly

Book ID: 116420690
Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 2004
Tongue: English
Weight: 76 KB
Volume: 82
Category: Article
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2003.05.002

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

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