I correct the statements of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 and the proof of Theorem 3.1 in Sato (Informational requirements of social choice rules, Mathematical Social Sciences 57 (2009) 188-198). I add a condition requiring that each rule in the theorems does not choose the entire set of the alternatives whe
β¦ LIBER β¦
Informational requirements of social choice rules
β Scribed by Shin Sato
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 2009
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 611 KB
- Volume
- 57
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0165-4896
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
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