๐”– Bobbio Scriptorium
โœฆ   LIBER   โœฆ

F-decomposable social aggregation rules and acyclic choice

โœ Scribed by M. Dasgupta; R. Deb


Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
1994
Tongue
English
Weight
724 KB
Volume
23
Category
Article
ISSN
0304-4068

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.


๐Ÿ“œ SIMILAR VOLUMES


Acyclic and continuous social choice inT
โœ Ryo-ichi Nagahisa ๐Ÿ“‚ Article ๐Ÿ“… 1991 ๐Ÿ› Springer ๐ŸŒ English โš– 875 KB

In this paper, we prove some versions of the Arrovian impossibility theorem in T~ connected alternatives spaces, with the collective rationality condition weakened from transitivity to acyclicity, the Pareto condition replaced by some weaker conditions, and a continuity condition of social preferenc