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A game-theoretic comparison of the utilitarian and maximin rules of social choice

✍ Scribed by Paul Weirich

Publisher
Springer
Year
1988
Tongue
English
Weight
767 KB
Volume
28
Category
Article
ISSN
1876-2514

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