Weakly implementable social choice rules

✍ Scribed by Taradas Bandyopadhyay; Larry Samuelson

• Publisher: Springer US
• Year: 1992
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 842 KB
• Volume: 33
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0040-5833
• DOI: 10.1007/bf00134093

✦ Synopsis

Previous investigations have shown that a social choice function which is partially implementable must be characterized by pervasive veto power. This paper investigates how much additional latitude in the design of social choice functions, and how much relief from this vetoers result, can be achieved by examining multi-valued social choice rules and relaxing the requirement of partial implementability to a requirement that we call weak partial implementability. We find that the power structures which characterize partially implementable social choice functions, including the veto properties, also characterize weakly partially implementable social choice rules. The conclusion is that invoking multi-valuedness and implementation of appealing social choice rules in strong Nash equilibria. Our results apparently exhaust the possibilities for implementation in strong Nash equilibrium. If any implementation possibility results are to be achieved, they can apparently come only by weakening the equilibrium requirement.