✦ LIBER ✦

On combining implementable social choice rules

✍ Scribed by Jean Pierre Benoît; Efe A. Ok; M. Remzi Sanver

Book ID: 116505762
Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 2007
Tongue: English
Weight: 147 KB
Volume: 60
Category: Article
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.11.001

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

📜 SIMILAR VOLUMES

Weakly implementable social choice rules

✍ Taradas Bandyopadhyay; Larry Samuelson 📂 Article 📅 1992 🏛 Springer US 🌐 English ⚖ 842 KB

Previous investigations have shown that a social choice function which is partially implementable must be characterized by pervasive veto power. This paper investigates how much additional latitude in the design of social choice functions, and how much relief from this vetoers result, can be achieve

Social choice rules implemented in domin

Social choice rules implemented in dominant strategies

✍ Haixiang Yao; Jianxin Yi 📂 Article 📅 2007 🏛 Elsevier Science 🌐 English ⚖ 137 KB

Intersection of Nash implementable socia

Intersection of Nash implementable social choice correspondences

✍ Levent Kutlu 📂 Article 📅 2008 🏛 Elsevier Science 🌐 English ⚖ 120 KB

Strongly implementable social choice cor

Strongly implementable social choice correspondences and the supernucleus

✍ Peter Fristrup; Hans Keiding 📂 Article 📅 2001 🏛 Springer 🌐 English ⚖ 128 KB

Nash implementing non-monotonic social c

Nash implementing non-monotonic social choice rules by awards

✍ M. Remzi Sanver 📂 Article 📅 2006 🏛 Springer 🌐 English ⚖ 88 KB

Social choice rules with vetoers

✍ Donald E. Campbell; Jerry S. Kelly 📂 Article 📅 2004 🏛 Elsevier Science 🌐 English ⚖ 76 KB