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Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication

✍ Scribed by Dino Gerardi; Roger B. Myerson

Book ID: 116505822
Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 2007
Tongue: English
Weight: 300 KB
Volume: 60
Category: Article
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.09.006

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