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Evolution in Bayesian games II: Stability of purified equilibria

✍ Scribed by William H. Sandholm

Book ID: 113707859
Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 2007
Tongue: English
Weight: 351 KB
Volume: 136
Category: Article
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.003

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