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Evolutionary Stability of Pure-Strategy Equilibria in Finite Games

✍ Scribed by E. Somanathan

Book ID: 115610986
Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 1997
Tongue: English
Weight: 175 KB
Volume: 21
Category: Article
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0533

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