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Characterization of pure strategy equilibria in finite anonymous games

✍ Scribed by Matthias Blonski

Book ID: 108432569
Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 2000
Tongue: English
Weight: 91 KB
Volume: 34
Category: Article
ISSN: 0304-4068
DOI: 10.1016/s0304-4068(99)00008-7

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