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Stability of pure strategy sampling equilibria

✍ Scribed by Michał Ramsza

Book ID: 105856141
Publisher: Springer-Verlag
Year: 2005
Tongue: English
Weight: 240 KB
Volume: 33
Category: Article
ISSN: 0020-7276
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-005-0212-x

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