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Approximation of Nash equilibria in Bayesian games

✍ Scribed by Olivier Armantier; Jean-Pierre Florens; Jean-Francois Richard

Publisher
John Wiley and Sons
Year
2008
Tongue
English
Weight
184 KB
Volume
23
Category
Article
ISSN
0883-7252

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✦ Synopsis

Abstract

We define a new concept of constrained strategic equilibrium (CSE) for Bayesian games. We show that a sequence of CSEs approximates an equilibrium under standard conditions. We also provide an algorithm to implement the CSE approximation method numerically in a broad class of Bayesian games, including games without analytically tractable solutions. Finally, we illustrate the flexibility of the CSE approximation with a series of auction examples, including a complex multi‐unit auction. Copyright Β© 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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