## Abstract We define a new concept of constrained strategic equilibrium (CSE) for Bayesian games. We show that a sequence of CSEs approximates an equilibrium under standard conditions. We also provide an algorithm to implement the CSE approximation method numerically in a broad class of Bayesian g
β¦ LIBER β¦
Nash equilibria in multineuron games
β Scribed by Robert H. Baran; James P. Coughlin
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 1990
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 179 KB
- Volume
- 14
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0895-7177
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