## Abstract We define a new concept of constrained strategic equilibrium (CSE) for Bayesian games. We show that a sequence of CSEs approximates an equilibrium under standard conditions. We also provide an algorithm to implement the CSE approximation method numerically in a broad class of Bayesian g
Computing approximate Nash equilibria in network congestion games
✍ Scribed by Andreas Emil Feldmann; Heiko Röglin; Berthold Vöcking
- Publisher
- John Wiley and Sons
- Year
- 2011
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 116 KB
- Volume
- 59
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0028-3045
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