## Abstract This paper considers the problem of the competition among a finite number of players who must transport the fixed volume of traffic on a simple network over a prescribed planning horizon. Each player attempts to minimize his total transportation cost by making simultaneous decisions of
✦ LIBER ✦
Congestion schemes and Nash equilibrium in complex networks
✍ Scribed by Juan A. Almendral; Luis López; Vicent Cholvi; Miguel A.F. Sanjuán
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 2005
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 250 KB
- Volume
- 355
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0378-4371
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
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