Sequential Correlated Equilibria in Stopping Games
β Scribed by Heller, Yuval
- Book ID
- 120379314
- Publisher
- INFORMS
- Year
- 2012
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 249 KB
- Volume
- 60
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0030-364X
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
π SIMILAR VOLUMES
This paper is our second study of correlated equilibria in nonzero-sum differential games of prescribed duration. Our first work, based on relaxed controls of the players, dealt with linear differential games. In this paper, we use mixed correlated strategies with finite supports and consider nonzer
We develop polynomial-time algorithms for finding correlated equilibriaβa well-studied notion of rationality that generalizes the Nash equilibriumβin a broad class of succinctly representable multiplayer games, encompassing graphical games, anonymous games, polymatrix games, congestion games, schedu