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Rewards in an experimental sender–receiver game

✍ Scribed by Ronald Peeters; Marc Vorsatz; Markus Walzl

Book ID: 116422094
Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 2008
Tongue: English
Weight: 188 KB
Volume: 101
Category: Article
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2008.07.016

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