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Equilibrium Refinements in Sender-Receiver Games

✍ Scribed by Andreas Blume

Book ID: 112257405
Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 1994
Tongue: English
Weight: 556 KB
Volume: 64
Category: Article
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1994.1054

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