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Full revelation of information in Sender–Receiver games of persuasion

✍ Scribed by Jérôme Mathis

Book ID: 113707977
Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 2008
Tongue: English
Weight: 166 KB
Volume: 143
Category: Article
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.12.002

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

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