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Verifiability and neologism-proofness in a Sender–Receiver game

✍ Scribed by Matthew Ryan; Rhema Vaithianathan

Book ID
116635888
Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
2011
Tongue
English
Weight
540 KB
Volume
79
Category
Article
ISSN
0167-2681

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