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Cartel formation and managerial incentives

✍ Scribed by Norma Olaizola

Publisher: Springer
Year: 2007
Tongue: English
Weight: 220 KB
Volume: 9
Category: Article
ISSN: 1435-5469
DOI: 10.1007/s10108-006-9023-x

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