This paper proposes a model in which firm diversification acts as an efficient form of nonpecuniary compensation for the manager. In the model diversification rewards the manager by reducing the likelihood of bankruptcy which in turn increases the expected value of his firm-specific human capital. U
Managerial risk reduction, incentives and firm value
β Scribed by Saltuk Ozerturk
- Publisher
- Springer
- Year
- 2006
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 105 KB
- Volume
- 27
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0938-2259
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