Bankruptcy risk, firm-specific managerial human capital, and diversification
β Scribed by David C. Rose
- Publisher
- Springer US
- Year
- 1992
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 585 KB
- Volume
- 7
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0889-938X
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
β¦ Synopsis
This paper proposes a model in which firm diversification acts as an efficient form of nonpecuniary compensation for the manager. In the model diversification rewards the manager by reducing the likelihood of bankruptcy which in turn increases the expected value of his firm-specific human capital. Unlike the principal-agent model of diversification, this model shows that diversification may be optimal even if the manager is risk neutral and his behavior can be observed by firm owners.
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