Manager fee contracts and managerial incentives
β Scribed by Gong Zhan
- Publisher
- Springer US
- Year
- 2011
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 359 KB
- Volume
- 14
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 1380-6645
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
π SIMILAR VOLUMES
In a differentiated Cournot duopoly, we examine the contracts that firms' owners use to compensate their managers and the resulting output levels, profits and social welfare. If products are either sufficiently differentiated or sufficiently close substitutes, owners use Relative Performance contrac
## Abstract Costβreducing investments by firms are often not publicly observable. This lack of observability would preclude a strategic use of process innovation. However, we show that an observable and verifiable contract that provides direct monetary incentives for cost reductions β an innovation