𝔖 Bobbio Scriptorium
✦   LIBER   ✦

Managerial incentives for process innovation

✍ Scribed by Bastiaan M. Overvest; Jasper Veldman


Publisher
John Wiley and Sons
Year
2008
Tongue
English
Weight
116 KB
Volume
29
Category
Article
ISSN
0143-6570

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

✦ Synopsis


Abstract

Cost‐reducing investments by firms are often not publicly observable. This lack of observability would preclude a strategic use of process innovation. However, we show that an observable and verifiable contract that provides direct monetary incentives for cost reductions β€” an innovation incentive contract β€” can act as a strategic commitment device. Our model predicts that manager‐led firms are more innovative than owner‐led firms and that these contracts become less prevalent as product market competition intensifies. Both predictions are consistent with recent empirical evidence. Copyright Β© 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.


πŸ“œ SIMILAR VOLUMES


Managerial expertise, learning potential
✍ Christian Lukas πŸ“‚ Article πŸ“… 2007 πŸ› John Wiley and Sons 🌐 English βš– 270 KB

## Abstract In this paper the impact of ability and learning potential on incentive contracts is analyzed. A central feature of the model is that the true ability will not be revealed. The learning potential of an agent is modeled as the magnitude of impact on the agent's expected ability that lear

Compensating for innovation: Do small fi
✍ Todd R. Zenger; Sergio G. Lazzarini πŸ“‚ Article πŸ“… 2004 πŸ› John Wiley and Sons 🌐 English βš– 175 KB

## Abstract Empirical studies commonly confirm that small firms enjoy efficiency advantages in generating innovation. However, the origin of this advantage remains poorly understood. This study explores the hypothesis that small firms enjoy advantages over large firms in crafting effective, incenti