## Abstract In this paper the impact of ability and learning potential on incentive contracts is analyzed. A central feature of the model is that the true ability will not be revealed. The learning potential of an agent is modeled as the magnitude of impact on the agent's expected ability that lear
Managerial incentives for process innovation
β Scribed by Bastiaan M. Overvest; Jasper Veldman
- Publisher
- John Wiley and Sons
- Year
- 2008
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 116 KB
- Volume
- 29
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0143-6570
- DOI
- 10.1002/mde.1416
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
β¦ Synopsis
Abstract
Costβreducing investments by firms are often not publicly observable. This lack of observability would preclude a strategic use of process innovation. However, we show that an observable and verifiable contract that provides direct monetary incentives for cost reductions β an innovation incentive contract β can act as a strategic commitment device. Our model predicts that managerβled firms are more innovative than ownerβled firms and that these contracts become less prevalent as product market competition intensifies. Both predictions are consistent with recent empirical evidence. Copyright Β© 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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