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Well Supported Approximate Equilibria in Bimatrix Games

✍ Scribed by Spyros C. Kontogiannis; Paul G. Spirakis

Publisher: Springer
Year: 2008
Tongue: English
Weight: 417 KB
Volume: 57
Category: Article
ISSN: 0178-4617
DOI: 10.1007/s00453-008-9227-6

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## Abstract We define a new concept of constrained strategic equilibrium (CSE) for Bayesian games. We show that a sequence of CSEs approximates an equilibrium under standard conditions. We also provide an algorithm to implement the CSE approximation method numerically in a broad class of Bayesian g