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Weak values, the core, and new axioms for the Shapley value

✍ Scribed by Norman L. Kleinberg; Jeffrey H. Weiss

Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
1986
Tongue
English
Weight
447 KB
Volume
12
Category
Article
ISSN
0165-4896

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πŸ“œ SIMILAR VOLUMES

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