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Axioms for the Shapley value on convex geometries

✍ Scribed by J.M. Bilbao

Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
1998
Tongue
English
Weight
481 KB
Volume
110
Category
Article
ISSN
0377-2217

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✦ Synopsis

The purpose of this article is an extension of Shapley's value for games with restricted cooperation. The classical model of cooperative game where every subset of players is a feasible coalition may be unrealistic. The feasible coalitions in our model will be the convex sets, i.e., those subsets of players belonging to a convex geometry La. In the last section, we apply this model to several examples about the power in the Council of Ministers of the European Union.

πŸ“œ SIMILAR VOLUMES

Axioms for Shapley values in games with
Axioms for Shapley values in games with quarrelling
✍ D. Marc Kilgour πŸ“‚ Article πŸ“… 1977 πŸ› Springer US 🌐 English βš– 435 KB

Four axioms, based on Shapley's original development of the Shapley value, are proposed for values of cooperative games with quarrelling. The collection of all values satisfying these axioms is shown to be the collection of values determined by a construction utilizing the proper choices of several