We prove the validity of an alternative representation of the Shapley-Shubik (1954) index of voting power, based on the following model. Voting in an assembly consisting of n voters is conducted by roll-call. Every voter is assumed to vote "yea" or "nay" with equal probability, and all n! possible o
β¦ LIBER β¦
On the coincidence of the prenucleolus and the Shapley value
β Scribed by Anirban Kar; Manipushpak Mitra; Suresh Mutuswami
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 2009
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 551 KB
- Volume
- 57
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0165-4896
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
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