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Voting cycles, plurality rule and strategic manipulation

✍ Scribed by Sven Berg; Dominique Lepelley

Book ID: 112711960
Publisher: Springer US
Year: 1990
Tongue: English
Weight: 426 KB
Volume: 23
Category: Article
ISSN: 0254-5330
DOI: 10.1007/bf02204849

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

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