This paper uses a particular choice rule over sets of alternatives under the Pareto rule. Starting from the sincere situation every strategic misrevelation of preference is shown to be an improvement for all voters. The existence of an equilibrium under successive misrepresentations by sincere voter
✦ LIBER ✦
Strategic delegation and voting rules
✍ Scribed by Bård Harstad
- Book ID
- 113751664
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 2010
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 375 KB
- Volume
- 94
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0047-2727
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
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